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ABSTRACT 
The theory and practice of psychiatric diagnosis are central yet contentious. This paper examines the heterogeneous nature of 
categories within the DSM-5, how this heterogeneity is expressed across diagnostic criteria, 
and its consequences for clinicians, clients, and the diagnostic model. Selected chapters of the DSM-5 were 
thematically analysed: schizophrenia spectrum and other psychotic disorders; bipolar and related disorders; 
depressive disorders; anxiety disorders; and trauma- and stressor-related disorders. Themes identified heterogeneity 
in specific diagnostic criteria, including symptom comparators, duration of difficulties, indicators of 
severity, and perspective used to assess difficulties. Wider variations across diagnostic categories examined 
symptom overlap across categories, and the role of trauma. Pragmatic criteria and difficulties that recur across 
multiple diagnostic categories offer flexibility for the clinician, but undermine the model of discrete categories of 
disorder. This nevertheless has implications for the way cause is conceptualised, such as implying that trauma 
affects only a limited number of diagnoses despite increasing evidence to the contrary. Individual experiences 
and specific causal pathways within diagnostic categories may also be obscured. A pragmatic approach to 
psychiatric assessment, allowing for recognition of individual experience, may therefore be a more effective way 
of understanding distress than maintaining commitment to a disingenuous categorical system. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Developments and amendments to systems of psychiatric classification 
can be understood within the perspective of wider social and 
cultural developments (Foucault, 1967). Amongst other consequences, 
these socio-political and historical roots have resulted in considerable 
inherent heterogeneity in a wide range of psychiatric diagnoses during 
their piecemeal development. For example, there are stark differences 
between highly specific diagnostic criteria and those with more flexibility 
around symptom presentation. As a result, there are almost 
24,000 possible symptom combinations for panic disorder in DSM-5, 
compared with just one possible combination for social phobia 
(Galatzer-Levy and Bryant, 2013). Olbert and colleagues (2014) also 
report considerable heterogeneity within the criteria of individual diagnoses, 
showing that in the majority of diagnoses in both DSM-IV-TR 
and DSM-5 (64% and 58.3% respectively), two people could receive the 
same diagnosis without sharing any common symptoms. Such ‘disjunctive’ 
categories have been described as scientifically meaningless. 
Bannister, for example, pointed out as early as 1968 that the ‘schizophrenia’ 
construct was ‘[a] semantic Titanic, doomed before it sails, a 
concept so diffuse as to be unusable in a scientific context’, largely 
because ‘disjunctive categories are logically too primitive for scientific 
use’ (Bannister, 1968, pp. 181–182). Young et al. (2014) memorably 
calculate that in the DSM-5 there are 270 million combinations of 
symptoms that would meet the criteria for both PTSD and major depressive 
disorder, and when five other commonly made diagnoses are 
seen alongside these two, this figure rises to one quintillion symptom 
combinations - more than the number of stars in the Milky Way. 
Diagnostic heterogeneity is problematic for both research and 
clinical practice. The limitations of focusing research on broad diagnostic 
categories over specific difficulties or distressing experiences are 
increasingly clear. Research into the relationship between childhood 
abuse and subsequent mental health difficulties is hampered by focusing 
on diagnostic categories (Read and Mayne, 2017), because the 
associations are between specific experiences and symptoms, which 
disregard diagnostic clusters. These associations include, for example, 
relationships between childhood experiences of loss and avoidance/ 
numbing, and between childhood sexual abuse and hyperarousal 
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(Read and Mayne, 2017). Furthermore, extensive research in psychosis 
demonstrates specific causal pathways, including between childhood 
sexual abuse and hearing voices, and institutionalisation and paranoia 
(Bentall et al., 2012). Longstanding focus on diagnostic categories 
means that evidence-based recommendations for interventions, both 
drug treatment and psychological therapies, are typically organised by 
diagnosis (e.g. National Institute for Health and Care Excellence, 2005; 
NICE, 2009), rather than on specific patterns or presentations of distress, 
thus recommendations are broad brush rather than individualised. 
The clinical implications of these diagnostically focused recommendations are 
twofold. First, clients may be referred for a brief psychological intervention for 
depression, for example, that follows a low intensity cognitive behavioural 
therapy protocol for depression (NICE, 2009), with little scope for 
individualised adaptations according to the specific difficulties experienced by 
the client. Second, clinicians must use alternative methods of clinical decision-
making to counter the limitations of heterogeneous diagnostic categories. Drug 
prescriptions are rarely made on the basis of a broad diagnosis, but instead 
according to the specific symptom presentation of the client (Taylor, 2016). 
Similarly, more specialised psychological therapy delivered by a clinical 
psychologist, for example, is guided by nuanced clinical formulation. 
Even psychiatrists may use a ‘diagnostic formulation’ to further expand 
upon the broad diagnostic category offered. 
Diagnostic heterogeneity is considered in this paper within the ways 
that the formal protocol of classification is applied in clinical practice to 
serve particular functions, and the impact that heterogeneity can have 
in the potential “slippage” (Star and Lampland, 2009, p. 15) between 
the two (Suchman, 1987). This study therefore examined the sources of 
heterogeneity within and across diagnostic categories. The consequences 
of heterogeneity were investigated; for clinicians, clients, 
and the theoretical conceptualisation of psychiatric diagnoses. 
 
2. Method 
 
For the purposes of manageability, this analysis focussed on five 
chapters of DSM-5: schizophrenia spectrum and other psychotic disorders; 
bipolar and related disorders; depressive disorders; anxiety 
disorders; and trauma- and stressor-related disorders. These chapters 
were chosen to reflect commonly reported ‘functional’ psychiatric diagnoses 
as highlighted by the Adult Psychiatric Morbidity Survey, including 
‘common mental disorders’, depression- and anxiety-related 
diagnoses (Stansfeld et al., 2016), and PTSD, bipolar, and psychotic 
disorder diagnoses (McManus et al., 2016). One common diagnosis 
(McManus et al., 2016) that is not contained within the included 
chapters is ‘obsessive-compulsive disorder’. Although previously listed 
within anxiety disorders in the DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000), the DSM-5 lists this diagnosis within its own 
chapter (obsessive-compulsive and related disorders), which contains 
numerous other diagnoses that are new and less common, such as 
‘trichotillomania’ (hair pulling) and ‘excoriation’ (skin picking). This 
chapter, therefore, was excluded for the purposes of this analysis. 
Childhood diagnoses (e.g. ‘reactive attachment disorder’; ‘disruptive 
mood dysregulation disorder’) were also excluded to enable consideration 
of diagnostic categories with the potential for consistency 
across assessment and reporting (for example, self-reporting of distress). 
 
2.1. Analysis 
 
Thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2006) was used to code 
themes or patterns of meaning across the diagnostic categories being 
analysed, with a particular focus on the heterogeneity or differences 
across the types of diagnostic criteria. Thematic analysis was used to 
identify the ways in which heterogeneity was represented across diagnostic 
categories, and to organise this heterogeneity into central themes 
of differences across the criteria. The first phase of the analysis focused 
on identifying heterogeneity or differences between the diagnostic 
criteria of each category within the five chapters analysed. Four areas of 
heterogeneity were identified within specific diagnostic criteria, and 
two that spanned across diagnostic categories. During this phase of 
coding, data were extracted from each set of diagnostic criteria in each 
of the five chapters, and coded line by line to the themes above. Subthemes 
were generated from the information within two codes (Standards 
to which symptoms are compared, and Duration of symptoms) as 
different ways of representing these themes emerged across diagnostic 
categories. The emergent coding framework was reviewed by authors 
PK and RC, with the aim of presenting alternative interpretations of the 
data. The coding framework was refined accordingly following discussions. 
 
3. Findings 
 
Heterogeneity in diagnostic criteria was found across each of the 
chapters of the DSM-5 that were examined; both within specific types of 
criteria, and more broadly across diagnostic categories. These themes 
are outlined in Table 1. Unless otherwise specified, page numbers refer 
to the DSM-5. 
 
3.1. Heterogeneity within specific diagnostic criteria 
3.1.1. The standards to which symptoms are compared 
 
A key element of heterogeneity stems from differences in the comparison 
of the experience of symptoms with subjectively normal or 
assumed normative functioning (or in the omission of such comparators). 
Diagnostic criteria are represented either by no comparator, or a 
change from previous functioning, behaviour, or mood. In particular, 
some experiences (such as low mood) are seen as problematic only at a 
particular threshold, while other experiences (such as hallucinations) 
are indicative of disorder by their presence alone (Table 2). 
 
3.1.1.1. Comparisons with prior experience. Most criteria specifying 
either change or comparisons with prior functioning or experience 
are mood-related (criteria which are also included within the diagnosis 
of schizoaffective disorder). Some descriptions explicitly note a 
comparison, for example, criterion A for a major depressive episode 
states, “[f]ive (or more) of the following symptoms have been present 
during the same 2-week period and represent a change from previous 
functioning” (p. 160). Other criteria imply a comparison with previous 
mood, for example, criterion A for persistent depressive disorder 
(dysthymia) requires “[d]epressed mood for most of the day…” (p. 
168); criterion A for a manic episode requires “[a] distinct period of 
abnormally and persistently elevated, expansive, or irritable mood and 
abnormally and persistently increased goal-directed activity or energy” 
(p. 124); criteria B2 and B3 for both manic and hypomanic episodes are 
“decreased need for sleep…” and “more talkative than usual…” (p. 124) 
respectively. Each of these implies comparison with a usual or 
acceptable behaviour or mood, such as sleep, which is altered to a 
problematic extent. Some of the criteria for schizophreniform disorder 
 
 
Table 1 
 
Outline of themes and subthemes. 
 
Heterogeneity within specific diagnostic criteria 
 
The standards to which symptoms are compared 
Comparisons with prior experience 
Comparison with socially expected responses 
No comparators 
Duration of symptoms 
Minimum duration 
No duration 
Discrete episodes 
Identifiers of severity 
Perspective from which distress is assessed 
 
Heterogeneity across diagnostic categories 
 
Symptom overlap across categories 
 
The role of trauma 
 
and schizophrenia diagnoses also imply a change from usual mood or 
motivation, including ‘negative symptoms’, described as “diminished 
emotional expression or avolition” (p. 99). 
 
3.1.1.2. Comparison with socially expected responses. Within mood  
episodes, and criteria for some anxiety and trauma-related diagnoses,  
there is a notion of ‘excessive’ behaviours or responses, suggesting a 
comparison with a socially expected response. For example, criterion 
B7 of manic and hypomanic episodes requires “excessive involvement 
in activities that have a high potential for painful consequences (e.g. 
engaging in unrestrained buying sprees, sexual indiscretions, or foolish 
business investments)” (p. 124). Criterion B7 of a major depressive 
episode assesses “feelings of worthlessness or excessive or inappropriate 
guilt…” (p. 125). Separation anxiety disorder similarly assesses 
“persistent and excessive worry" (A2, p. 190). In another way of 
assessing a person's response in comparison with expected responses, 
specific phobia and adjustment disorder both require the response to be 
“out of proportion” (pp. 197, 286), with either the object or situation 
(social phobia) or the stressor (adjustment disorder). A subjective 
judgement is required to assess whether a person's experiences are 
out of line with typically expected responses. This is discussed further in 
the theme of ‘Perspective from which distress is assessed’. 
 
3.1.1.3. No comparators. By contrast, other criteria do not compare 
symptoms with a person's previous experience. This is particularly 
apparent for ‘positive symptoms’ of psychosis; the presence of delusions 
and hallucinations, for example, is never stated in diagnostic criteria 
alongside comparison. Non-compared examples from mood disorder 
diagnoses include “feelings of worthlessness” or “recurrent thoughts of 
death…” (criteria A7 and A9, respectively, of a major depressive 
episode), and “flight of ideas…” or “distractibility…” (criteria B4 and 
B5, respectively, of manic and hypomanic episodes). The mood 
disorders chapters give a mixed presentation of criteria with both 
comparators and no comparators. Three or more of the experiences 
described in criterion B must be present for identification of a manic or 
hypomanic episode, meaning that presentations of these episodes could 
reflect either discontinuous experiences, experiences across a 
continuum, or a mixture of the two. The criteria for PTSD and acute 
stress disorder notably omit comparators; “[r]ecurrent, involuntary, 
and intrusive distressing memories of the traumatic event(s)” (B1, e.g. 
p. 271) and “dissociative reactions (e.g. flashbacks)…” (B3, e.g. p. 271) 
are examples of criteria for both these diagnoses that are compared 
with neither expected responses nor prior functioning. By not using 
comparators, these experiences are set up as inherently disordered or 
pathological and so are inconsistent with continuum models of 
functioning. 
The diagnostic criteria for PTSD and acute stress disorder nevertheless 
require a change in thoughts, behaviours and emotions following 
trauma. The criteria are also explicit about the severity of 
trauma experienced, after which it would be expected that most people 
would experience distress. However, there are no comparators to 
identify what a ‘normal’ or ‘appropriate’ response to such a severe 
stressor would entail. That is, there is no information about how to 
identify at what point someone has a ‘disordered’ response as opposed 
to one that is ‘normal’. In the case of the criteria for panic disorder, 
behaviour change related to panic attacks is constructed as unusual or 
unacceptable by what is described as ‘maladaptive’ criteria, despite this 
behaviour (such as “behaviors designed to avoid having panic attacks”, 
p. 208) representing attempts to cope with the experience of panic attacks. 
 
3.1.2. Duration of symptoms 
 
There were three subthemes representing heterogeneity within the 
duration of symptoms or experiences described by diagnostic criteria in 
the DSM-5: no duration, discrete episodes, and a minimum duration. 
These timeframes effectively construct different ‘kinds’ of disorder categories 
(Table 3). 
 
3.1.2.1. Minimum duration. Most of the analysed diagnostic categories 
have a minimum duration requirement. For example, continuous signs 
of disturbance for at least 6 months (schizophrenia, Criterion C), or at 
least 2 years of depressed mood (persistent depressive disorder - 
dysthymia - Criterion A). In the absence of other indicators of 
‘disorder’ (such as biomedical markers), a minimum duration 
requirement constructs a definition of severity. Giving a minimum 
duration criterion creates a way of separating between ‘everyday’ 
distress and that which is considered ‘clinical’, or otherwise abnormal 
and therefore in need of support. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
 
The standards to which symptoms are compared. 
 
Subtheme     Example from DSM-5 
 
Comparisons with prior experience   Major depressive episode: “[f]ive (or more) of the following symptoms have been present during the same 2-week period and 
represent a change from previous functioning” (Criterion A, p. 160). 
Persistent depressive disorder (dysthymia): “[d]epressed mood for most of the day…” (Criterion A, p. 168) 
Manic episode: episode requires “[a] distinct period of abnormally and persistently elevated, expansive, or irritable mood and 
abnormally and persistently increased goal-directed activity or energy” (Criterion A, p. 124) 
Manic and hypomanic episodes: “decreased need for sleep…” and “more talkative than usual…” (Criteria B2 and B3, p. 124) 
Comparison with socially expected responses  Manic and hypomanic episodes: “excessive involvement in activities that have a high potential for painful consequences (e.g. 
engaging in unrestrained buying sprees, sexual indiscretions, or foolish business investments)” (Criterion B7, p. 124) 
Major depressive episode: “feelings of worthlessness or excessive or inappropriate guilt…” (Criterion B7, p. 125) 
Separation anxiety disorder: “persistent and excessive worry" (Criterion A2, p. 190) 
No comparators    Major depressive episode: “feelings of worthlessness” or “recurrent thoughts of death…” (Criteria A7 and A9, p.125) 
Manic and hypomanic episodes: “flight of ideas…” or “distractibility…” (Criteria B4 and B5, p.124) 
PTSD and acute stress disorder: “[r]ecurrent, involuntary, and intrusive distressing memories of the traumatic event(s)” or 
“dissociative reactions (e.g. flashbacks)…” (B1, e.g. p. 271) and (B3, e.g. p. 271) 
 
 
Table 3 
 
Duration of symptoms. 
 
Subtheme     Example from DSM-5 
 
Minimum duration    Schizophrenia: “Continuous signs of disturbance for at least 6 months” (Criterion C, p. 99) 
Persistent depressive disorder (dysthymia): “at least 2 years of depressed mood” (Criterion A, p. 139) 
No duration     Difficulties ‘due to other medical conditions’: All chapters, with the exception of trauma-related disorders 
Discrete episodes    Brief psychotic disorder: A specific duration such as one day to one month (Criterion B, p. 94) 
Acute stress disorder: 3 days to 1 month after trauma exposure (Criterion C p. 281). 
Adjustment disorders: The symptoms associated with must occur within 3 months of a stressor and not persist for more than 6 months “once the 
stressor and its consequences have terminated” (Criterion E, p.287) 
The bipolar and related disorders chapter (including, e.g. cyclothymia) and the category of major depressive disorder are unique in that several 
episodes are combined in various ways to produce disorders presented as distinct from one another. 
 
 
3.1.2.2. No duration. The criteria for certain diagnoses do not use a 
timeframe. For example, each chapter (with the exception of traumarelated 
disorders) includes difficulties ‘due to other medical conditions’, 
with no particular duration needed to meet these criteria. These 
diagnoses must be the ‘direct pathophysiological consequence of 
another medical condition’ (e.g. p. 120). This use of physiological 
signs set these diagnoses apart from other functional diagnoses, 
suggesting that functional diagnoses use timeframes to bolster 
descriptive diagnoses in the absence of physiological markers. 
Other diagnoses that do not require a particular duration are ‘other 
specified’ and ‘unspecified’ diagnoses at the end of each of chapter. 
These categories have very broad criteria because they are specifically 
included to incorporate difficulties that do not meet the criteria for 
other diagnoses. The experiences have to be characteristic of other diagnoses 
in their chapter, and cause clinically significant distress or 
impairment in functioning (discussed later). However, the ‘unspecified’ 
diagnoses do not list any criteria, leaving these categories entirely open 
to clinical judgement. The ‘other specified’ diagnoses for the schizophrenia 
spectrum and other psychotic disorders, bipolar and related 
disorders and anxiety disorders chapters give options, without durations, 
for specified difficulties. For example, ‘persistent auditory hallucinations 
occurring in the absence of any other features’, a much 
briefer criterion than those used for the other diagnoses within the 
schizophrenia spectrum and other psychotic disorders chapter. 
 
3.1.2.3. Discrete episodes. Least common are diagnoses that represent 
discrete episodes, with a specific duration such as one day to one month 
(e.g. brief psychotic disorder) or 3 days to 1 month after trauma 
exposure (acute stress disorder p. 281). The symptoms associated with 
adjustment disorders must occur within 3 months of a stressor and not 
persist for more than 6 months “once the stressor and its consequences 
have terminated” (Criterion E, p. 287). These episodic diagnoses 
suggest either an expectation of an end point that is not present for 
those with a minimum duration, or, more pragmatically, allow 
difficulties to be diagnosed (and treated) before the minimum time 
period is reached for other diagnoses such as PTSD. 
Bipolar and depressive disorders are treated differently again. The 
bipolar and related disorders chapter (including, e.g. cyclothymia) and 
the category of major depressive disorder are unique in that several 
episodes are combined in various ways to produce disorders presented 
as distinct from one another. Major depressive and manic episodes are 
the two key episodes from which hypomanic episode (shorter duration 
and lesser severity than manic episode) and a mixed features specifier 
(criteria are met for one episode, with features of another during the 
same timeframe) are derived. The three episodes are then variously 
combined to create eight different diagnostic categories (seven bipolar related 
diagnoses, and major depressive disorder). 
 
3.1.3. Identifiers of severity 
In some cases, severity indicators are prioritised over duration requirements, 
for example, where hospitalisation or the presence of 
 
psychotic features render consideration of duration unnecessary (manic 
episodes and bipolar and related disorders due to another medical 
condition). Most categories stipulate a criterion of “clinically significant 
distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas 
of functioning” (e.g. criterion B, major depressive disorder, p. 161), to 
establish a particular threshold for diagnosis (p. 21). However, the 
threshold is not defined, and therefore represents a subjective judgement, 
presumably the clinician's. A separate concept of a marked 
change in social, occupational or other areas of functioning (schizophrenia; 
manic episode) allows the criterion to be met in the absence of 
distress. These variations across criteria demonstrate the pragmatic 
nature of diagnostic categories and their use as clinical tools. For example, 
if a person's behaviour is distressing to others, but not to 
themselves, the clinician has the flexibility to override the need for 
clinically significant distress and make the diagnosis regardless 
(Table 4). 
DSM-5 contains a dimensional severity rating of 0–4 for each criterion 
A symptom for delusional, brief psychotic, schizophreniform and 
schizoaffective disorder criteria. This may, for example, relate to either 
the pressure to respond to voices or delusions or to what extent the 
individual is bothered by this experience. For other experiences, such as 
disorganised speech, the rating is pragmatically based on clinical observation 
rather than the individual's experience of these difficulties, so 
that the individual is not required to recognise their own disordered 
speech. Other mood-related diagnoses (bipolar, major depression, and 
related disorders) can be rated using a broad dimensional specifier of 
mild, moderate, severe, or with psychotic features. 
 
3.1.4. Perspective from which distress is assessed 
 
This theme describes the point of view from which distress or other 
diagnostic criteria are assessed, for example, from the account of the 
individual being assessed, others around them (e.g. family or friends), 
or the assessing clinician. In general, the DSM-5 represents a shift towards 
the perspective of the observer, whereas several DSM-IV-TR diagnoses 
relied on the individual as the principal (or only) source of 
information. For example, for DSM-IV-TR social phobia (social anxiety 
disorder in DSM-5), reference is made to “marked distress about having 
the phobia” (criterion E) and that the “person recognises that the fear is 
excessive or unreasonable” (criterion C). In comparison, whilst the fears 
themselves are self-reported in the DSM-5 version of social anxiety 
disorder, the criteria otherwise rely on the perspective of the observer. 
Represented within this shift towards the perspective of the observer is 
an assumption about insight and the capacity to self-report; an assumption 
frequently associated with psychotic experiences. However, 
this assumption is not explicitly stated in the diagnoses, and therefore 
reinforces the fallacious assumption that all people experiencing mental 
health problems tend to ‘lack insight’. Thus, the distress criterion is 
removed and the individual need not recognise that their fear is excessive, 
as the clinician makes this judgement. In another example, 
 
 
Table 4 
 
Identifiers of severity. 
 
Method of identifying severity   Example from DSM-5 
 
Clinically significant distress   Major depressive disorder; 
Post-traumatic stress disorder; 
Acute stress disorder: 
“Clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning” (e.g. Criterion B, p. 161) 
Marked change    Schizophrenia: “For a significant portion of the time since the onset of the disturbance, level of functioning in one or more major areas, such as 
work, interpersonal relations, or self-care, is markedly below the level achieved prior to the onset…” (Criterion B, p. 99) 
Manic episode: “marked impairment in social or occupational functioning…” (Criterion C, p. 124) 
Dimensional severity rating  Delusional, brief psychotic, schizophreniform and schizoaffective disorders: Dimensional severity rating of 0–4 for each Criterion A symptom 
for criteria. This may, for example, relate to either the pressure to respond to voices or delusions or to what extent the individual is bothered by 
this experience. For other experiences, such as disorganised speech, the rating is pragmatically based on clinical observation rather than the 
individual's experience of these difficulties 
Dimensional specifier    Mood-related diagnoses (bipolar, major depression, and related disorders): Can be rated using a broad dimensional specifier of mild, moderate, 
severe, or with psychotic features. 
 
 
reference to “excessive involvement in activities that have a high potential 
for painful consequences (e.g. engaging in unrestrained buying 
sprees, sexual indiscretions, or foolish business investments)” (manic 
and hypomanic episodes, p. 124) constructs a socially accepted level at 
which the behaviours are considered normal versus abnormal. The 
perspective here demonstrates the power held by the assessing clinician 
(or others, such as family) by virtue of the diagnostic criteria sanctioning 
the making of a value judgement. For other diagnoses, this 
person's perspective is implied but not explicit, for instance, experiences 
such as distress and distressing memories, flashbacks and physiological 
reactions (PTSD, Criterion B). Finally, in many cases, the question of 
perspective (who is making the judgment as to whether the criterion is 
met) is unambiguously ambiguous, as in the case of major depressive 
episode; “as indicated by subjective report… or observation made by 
others”. In a pragmatic approach, information is collected, from a range 
of sources, to assess whether or not the diagnostic criteria are met 
(Table 5). 
 
3.2. Wider heterogeneity across diagnostic categories 
3.2.1. Symptom overlap across categories 
 
Similar or the same experiences occur in multiple diagnostic categories. 
Major depressive episode, for example, features within the criteria 
for major depressive disorder, bipolar and related disorders, and 
can be included within the criteria for schizoaffective disorder (for 
which criterion A requires the occurrence of “a major mood episode 
(major depressive or manic)”, p. 105). Likewise, hallucinations can 
occur in schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders, but also in major 
depressive disorder with psychotic features, bipolar and related disorders 
(except cyclothymia), and PTSD (Table 6). 
DSM-5 refers to bipolar disorders bridging between psychotic 
disorders and depressive disorders, and likewise that schizoaffective 
disorder bridges several diagnoses. Despite this repetition of experiences, 
there is no explicit statement provided in the DSM about the 
phenomenological or qualitative experience of symptoms across different 
diagnoses. The DSM-5 acknowledges, 
Although DSM-5 remains a categorical classification of separate 
disorders, we recognize that mental disorders do not always fit completely 
within the boundaries of a single disorder. Some symptom domains, 
such as depression and anxiety, involve multiple diagnostic categories 
and may reflect common underlying vulnerabilities for a larger 
group of disorders… (p. xli) 
Ten specifiers are provided with the DSM-5 to allow the clinician to 
represent other patterns not contained within the main diagnostic criteria 
for bipolar and major depressive disorders, such as with anxious 
distress, rapid cycling (for bipolar and related disorders), or psychotic 
features. The range of experiences incorporated within these specifiers 
acknowledges the heterogeneity of diagnoses. Depressive episodes are 
no longer required in DSM-5 criteria for bipolar I, and the diagnostic 
criteria for cyclothymic disorder incorporates only experiences that are 
sub-threshold for both hypomania and a major depressive episode. 
These changes and the additional specifier of ‘anxious distress’ for bipolar 
and MDD diagnoses represents a shift towards broadening the 
range of experiences captured by the same diagnostic labels. The ‘mixed 
features’ specifier further blurs the boundary between depression and 
bipolar diagnoses in that it can be added to episodes of depression 
within the context of major depressive disorder where there are 
symptoms of mania or hypomania present. Likewise, panic attacks can 
be used as an adjunct to any DSM-5 diagnosis, and catatonia can be 
specified across various diagnoses spanning several chapters (including 
neurodevelopmental, psychotic, bipolar, and depressive disorder diagnoses, 
and other medical conditions). 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2.2. The role of trauma 
 
The DSM-5 states at the outset the atheoretical nature of diagnostic 
categories, however, one chapter of diagnoses is explicitly framed as 
caused by or directly influenced by external factors; trauma- and 
stressor-related disorders. The conceptualisation constructed by this 
addition of causal information is a notable difference from the other 
analysed chapters. For example, despite PTSD being described as a response 
to an extreme traumatic stressor that would be distressing for 
anyone to experience (“Exposure to actual or threatened death, serious 
injury, or sexual violence…” criterion A, p. 271), in assigning the diagnosis 
the individual's response is categorised as disordered. A related 
dilemma can be seen in the remarkable semantic similarity between 
various criteria for schizophrenia and PTSD diagnoses in DSM-5. These 
include affective flattening and avolition, as well as hallucinations, 
dissociative flashback episodes, restricted range of affect, and markedly 
diminished interest or participation in significant activities. All of these 
experiences would, in the presence of a traumatic event, be broadly 
consistent with a diagnosis of PTSD. Furthermore, Table 7 illustrates 
the diagnoses explicitly associated with trauma in DSM-5, and the DSM- 
5 diagnoses that have been associated with childhood trauma or adverse 
life experiences. 
 
4. Discussion 
 
As the DSM-5 acknowledges that experiences do not always fit 
within the boundaries of a specific disorder, its rules are therefore internally 
inconsistent. The manual presents a classification of discrete, 
homogeneous disorders, yet acknowledges that this structure cannot 
always be followed due to the overlap between diagnostic categories. 
Much of the heterogeneity identified in the above analysis is borne out 
of pragmatic consideration for the application of the DSM-5 into clinical 
practice. These allowances introduce flexibility for the clinician; giving 
the possibility of categorising extraneous symptoms that do not fit 
neatly within a diagnosis, or identifying experiences or behaviours as 
distressing or disruptive for others despite not necessarily being distressing 
for the individual being assessed. Yet, this heterogeneous 
flexibility has important consequences for the diagnostic classification's 
model of discrete disorders and the way cause is understood. 
4.1. Theoretical implications: threats to the model of discrete disorders 
The introduction of methods of clinical flexibility and 
transdiagnostic clinical features, such as ‘anxious distress’ or ‘psychotic 
features’, are contradictory to the DSM-5′s underpinning model of discrete 
disorders. Within diagnostic criteria, the same diagnosis may be 
applied in different ways by the clinician to suit individual situations 
and presentations. Whilst clinically practical, such criteria introduce 
heterogeneity and detract from the DSM-5′s presentation of diagnoses 
as rigorously and consistently applied criteria that represent stable, 
homogeneous disorders. In respect of these threats to the diagnostic 
model whereby clinical utility is prioritised over theoretical consistency, 
it would be more useful to adopt an assessment approach that 
embraces this pragmatism, without simultaneously attempting to do 
this within the confines of a strict diagnostic model. 
 
4.2. Clinical implications: understanding cause 
 
By making reference to trauma or stressors only in one dedicated 
chapter, the DSM-5 implies that other diagnostic categories are unrelated 
to trauma. The consideration of social, psychological, or other 
adversities within diagnoses is therefore minimised; symptoms are 
constructed as anomalous or disordered, rather than potentially understandable 
in relation to a person's life experiences. Even within the 
trauma- and stressor-related disorders chapter, the experiences assessed, 
despite being specifically linked with trauma, are seen as 
symptomatic of a disordered or inappropriate response to that trauma. 
Table 5 
 
Perspective from which distress is assessed. 
 
Subtheme    Example from DSM-5 
Self-report    Manic and hypomanic episodes: “decreased need for sleep (e.g. feels rested after only 3 h of sleep)” (Criterion B2, p. 124) 
Persistent depressive disorder (dysthymia): e.g. “low energy” (Criterion B2, p. 168; “low self-esteem” (Criterion B4, p. 168) 
Pre-menstrual dysphoric disorder: e.g. “marked irritability…” (Criterion B2, p. 172); “lethargy” (Criterion C3, p. 172) 
Panic disorder: “persistent concern or worry about additional panic attacks…” (Criterion B1, p. 208) 
Generalised anxiety disorder: “the individual finds it difficult to control the worry” (Criterion B, p. 222) 
Post-traumatic stress disorder: “e.g. “recurrent, involuntary, and intrusive distressing memories of the traumatic event” (Criterion B1, p. 271) 
Clinician's judgement  Manic and hypomanic episodes: “During the period of mood disturbance… the following symptoms… are present to a significant degree and represent a 
noticeable change from usual behaviour” (Criterion B, p. 124) 
Major depressive episode & Major depressive disorder: “psychomotor agitation or retardation… observable by others; not merely subjective 
feelings of restlessness or being slowed down” (Criterion A5, p. 161) 
Separation anxiety disorder: “Developmentally inappropriate and excessive fear or anxiety…” (Criterion A, p. 190) 
Ambiguous or unstated perspective  Manic and hypomanic episodes: “inflated self-esteem or grandiosity” “distractibility… as reported or observed”; “Excessive involvement in 
activities that have a high potential for painful consequences (e.g. engaging in unrestrained buying sprees, sexual indiscretions, or foolish 
business investments)” (Criteria B1; B5, and B7, respectively, p. 124) 
Major depressive episode & Major depressive disorder: “Depressed mood… as indicated by either subjective report… or observation by 
others…”; “Markedly diminished interest or pleasure…as indicated by either subjective account or observation“; “Feelings of worthlessness 
or excessive or inappropriate guilt…”; “Diminished ability to think or concentrate…either be subjective account or as observed by others” 
(Criteria A1, A2, A7, and A8, respectively, p. 160–1) 
Specific phobia & social anxiety disorder (social phobia): “The fear or anxiety is out of proportion to the actual danger posed by the specific 
object or situation and to the sociocultural context” 
All schizophrenia & psychotic disorders; Presence of hallucinations and/or delusions 
 
Table 6 
 
Symptom overlap across categories. 
 
Specifier   Diagnostic categories to which this specifier can be added 
Anxious distress  Bipolar and related disorders 
Depressive disorders 
Psychotic features  Bipolar and related disorders 
Depressive disorders 
Schizophrenia spectrum and other psychotic disorders 
Trauma and stressor related disorders 
Neurocognitive disorders 
Personality disorders 
Rapid cycling  Bipolar and related disorders 
Mixed features  Depressive episode 
Bipolar and related disorders 
Anxiety disorders 
Panic attacks  Any DSM-5 diagnosis 
Catatonia   Neurodevelopmental disorders 
Psychotic disorders 
Bipolar disorder 
Major depressive disorder 
Other medical conditions 
 
The reverse of the implications of singling out one trauma-related 
chapter is acknowledged by Spitzer and First; in their response to the 
suggestion of clustering diagnostic categories by cause, they stated: 
Most problematic is the characterization of the first cluster as patients 
with “brain disease.” Psychiatry has abandoned the reductionist 
“organic” vs “functional” distinction and now regards all 
mental disorders as disorders of brain function. It would be a big 
leap backward to delineate a subgroup of DSM disorders as involving 
“brain disease” with the implication that in other mental disorders 
brain functioning is unimpaired (Spitzer and First, 2005, p. 
1898). 
By the same logic the same can be said of the role of trauma; for the 
majority of the DSM-5 diagnostic categories, the criteria suggest to 
clinicians that these difficulties are caused by the disorder (and implicitly 
that these disorders are associated with brain function), and 
may therefore limit exploration further than identification of the disorder. 
However, just as Wakefield (2013) describes how stressors other 
than grief might also be related to experiences of low mood and depression, 
accumulating evidence demonstrates that trauma or adversity 
is involved in the development of many conditions and symptoms including 
psychosis and bipolar disorder (Bentall et al., 2012; Palmier- 
Claus et al., 2016; Varese et al., 2012). Clinical implications may include 
a focus on symptom reduction, on reducing those experiences 
seen as inherently disordered, such as voice hearing, rather than on 
removing only the distress associated with the experiences. In addition, 
labelling distress as abnormal may in itself create further distress. For 
example, flashbacks in the context of trauma are distressing in 
 
themselves, but the diagnosis has the potential to make the experience 
more distressing because the flashbacks are regarded as abnormal. 
Furthermore, by obscuring heterogeneity within categories, psychiatric 
diagnoses arguably obscure causal heterogeneity or other key 
differences between individuals (Olbert et al., 2014). Evidence already 
suggests that there may be distinct pathways in the development of 
specific experiences identified within the diagnostic criteria of schizophrenia, 
for example, strong associations between childhood sexual 
abuse and hallucinations, compared with childhood neglect or 
institutionalization and paranoia (Bentall et al., 2014). Likewise, in the 
drive to create unique diagnostic entities by separating collections of 
experiences from each other, potentially important similarities in the 
experiences, or even processes, that exist across diagnoses may be lost. 
An example of this may include similar causal mechanisms for voicehearing 
by individuals diagnosed with either bipolar disorder or schizophrenia 
(e.g. Hammersley et al., 2003). 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This analysis of chapters of the DSM-5 demonstrates that multiple 
forms of heterogeneity are found across and within diagnostic categories. 
This heterogeneity has important implications for research, 
clinical practice, and the provision of care that is specific to a person's 
individual needs. Pragmatic diagnostic criteria and idiosyncrasies offer 
flexibility for psychiatrists to use ‘clinical judgement’, but they undermine 
the model of discrete categories of disorder. Yet the diagnostic 
model still has implications for the way that cause is understood; limited 
reference to trauma implies that it affects only a limited number of 
diagnoses, despite increasing evidence to the contrary. Furthermore, by 
focusing on diagnostic categories, individual experiences of distress and 
specific causal pathways may be obscured. A pragmatic approach to 
psychiatric assessment, which allows for recognition of individual experience, 
may therefore be a more effective way of understanding 
distress than maintaining a commitment to a disingenuous categorical 
system. 
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Relationship between DSM-5 diagnoses and trauma. 
 
DSM-5 diagnoses with explicit mention of trauma   DSM-5 diagnoses with associations with childhood adversities/ trauma, demonstrated through meta-analyses 
Acute stress disorder     Depression (Mandelli et al., 2015) 
PTSD      Anxiety (Lindert et al., 2013) 
Adjustment disorders     Obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) (Miller and Brock, 2017) 
Non-suicidal self-harm (Liu et al., 2016) 
Functional neurological (conversion) disorders / medically unexplained symptoms (Ludwig et al., 2018) 
Dissociation (Rafiq et al., 2018; Vonderlin et al., 2018) 
Eating disorders (Molendijk et al., 2017) 
Schizophrenia and psychotic disorders (Varese et al., 2012) 
Bipolar disorder and related disorders (Palmier-Claus et al., 2016)
 
 
 
 
 
Declarations of interest 
 
Dr Allsopp reports grants from University of Liverpool and Pearson 
Clinical Assessment during the conduct of the study. 
Professor Read was employed by the University of Liverpool when 
the work presented in this paper was undertaken. He is now employed 
by the University of East London. He is on the Boards of the 
International Society for Psychological and Social Approaches to 
Psychosis (UK branch), the Hearing Voices Network - England, and the 
International Institute for Psychiatric Drug Withdrawal, and is a 
member of the Council for Evidence-based Psychiatry. 
Professor Corcoran is employed by the University of Liverpool. She 
is part funded by the National Institute of Health Research 
Collaborative Leadership in Applied Health Research and Care North 
West Coast (NIHR CLAHRC NWC). The views expressed are those of the 
authors and not necessarily those of the NHS or NIHR. She also receives 
funding from the Economic and Social Research Council and from 
Mersey Care NHS Foundation Trust. She is a Trustee of the Liverpool 
Mental Health Consortium 
Professor Kinderman is employed by the University of Liverpool, 
and has received funding from a number of research charities and 
Councils. He is a former President of the British Psychological Society, a 
member of the Council for Evidence-based Psychiatry and a trustee of 
the Joanna Simpson Foundation. He is an honorary consultant clinical 
psychologist with Mersey Care NHS Trust, and works occasionally for 
the BBC. 
 
CRediT authorship contribution statement 
Kate Allsopp: Data curation, Formal analysis, Writing - original 
draft. John Read: Writing - review & editing. Rhiannon Corcoran: 
Writing - review & editing. Peter Kinderman: Writing - review & 
editing. 
 
Supplementary materials 
Supplementary material associated with this article can be found, in 
the online version, at doi:10.1016/j.psychres.2019.07.005. 
 
References 
 
American Psychiatric Association (APA), 2000. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders: DSM-IV-TR®. American Psychiatric Association. https://doi.org/ 
10.1176/appi.books.9780890423349. 
Bannister, D., 1968. The logical requirements o f research into schizophrenia. Br. J. 
Psychiatry 114, 181–188. 
Bentall, R.P., de Sousa, P., Varese, F., Wickham, S., Sitko, K., Haarmans, M., Read, J., 
2014. From adversity to psychosis: pathways and mechanisms from specific adversities 
to specific symptoms. Soc. Psychiatry Psychiatr. Epidemiol. 49, 1011–1022. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00127-014-0914-0. 
Bentall, R P, Wickham, S., Shevlin, M., Varese, F., 2012. Do specific early-life adversities 
lead to specific symptoms of psychosis? A study from the 2007 the adult psychiatric 
morbidity survey. Schizophr. Bull 38, 734–740. https://doi.org/10.1093/schbul/ 
sbs049. 
Braun, V., Clarke, V., 2006. Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qual. Res. Psychol. 3, 
77–101. https://doi.org/10.1191/1478088706qp063oa. 
Foucault, M., 1967. Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason. 
Pantheon Books, New York. 
Galatzer-Levy, I.R., Bryant, R.A., 2013. 636,120 Ways to have posttraumatic stress disorder. 
Perspect. Psychol. Sci. 8, 651–662. 
Hammersley, P., Dias, A., Todd, G., Bowen-jones, K.I.M., Reilly, B., Bentall, R.P., Jones, 
B.-, 2003. Childhood trauma and hallucinations in bipolar affective disorder : preliminary 
investigation childhood trauma and hallucinations in bipolar affective disorder 
: preliminary investigation 543–547. https://doi.org/10.1192/02-151. 
Lindert, J., Von Ehrenstein, O.S., Grashow, R., Gilad, Gal, Braehler, E., Weisskopf, M.G., 
2013. Sexual and physical abuse in childhood is associated with depression and anxiety 
over the life course: systematic review and meta-analysis. Ó Swiss Sch. Public 
Heal. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00038-013-0519-5. 
Liu, R.T., Cheek, S.M., Nestor, B.A., 2016. Non-suicidal self-injury and life stress: a systematic 
meta-analysis and theoretical elaboration. Clin. Psychol. Rev. 47, 1–14. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpr.2016.05.005. 
Ludwig, L., Pasman, J.A., Nicholson, T., Aybek, S., David, A.S., Tuck, S., Kanaan, R.A., 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Roelofs, K., Carson, A., Stone, J., 2018. Stressful life events and maltreatment in 
conversion (functional neurological) disorder: systematic review and meta-analysis of 
case-control studies. Lancet Psychiatry 5, 307–320. https://doi.org/10.1016/S2215- 
0366(18)30051-8. 
Mandelli, L., Petrelli, C., Serretti, A., 2015. The role of specific early trauma in adult 
depression: a meta-analysis of published literature. Childhood trauma and adult depression. 
Eur. Psychiatry 30, 665–680. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eurpsy.2015.04. 
007. 
McManus, S., Bebbington, P., Jenkins, R., Brugha, T., 2016. Mental Health and Wellbeing 
in England: Adult Psychiatric Morbidity Survey 2014. 
Miller, M.L., Brock, R.L., 2017. The effect of trauma on the severity of obsessive-compulsive 
spectrum symptoms: a meta-analysis. J. Anxiety Disord. 47, 29–44. https:// 
doi.org/10.1016/J.JANXDIS.2017.02.005. 
Molendijk, M.L., Hoek, H.W., Brewerton, T.D., Elzinga, B.M., 2017. Childhood maltreatment 
and eating disorder pathology: a systematic review and dose-response 
meta-analysis. Psychol. Med. 47, 1402–1416. https://doi.org/10.1017/ 
S0033291716003561. 
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence, 2005. Post-traumatic stress disorder: 
mManagement. Author. 
NICE, 2009. Depression in adults: recognition and management. Clin. Guidel [CG90]. 
Olbert, C.M., Gala, G.J., Tupler, L.A., 2014. Quantifying heterogeneity attributable to 
polythetic diagnostic criteria: theoretical framework and empirical application. J. 
Abnorm. Psychol. 123, 452–462. 
Palmier-Claus, J.E., Berry, K., Bucci, S., Mansell, W., Varese, F., 2016. Relationship between 
childhood adversity and bipolar affective disorder: systematic review and 
meta-analysis. Br J Psychiatry 209, 454–459. https://doi.org/10.1192/bjp.bp.115. 
179655. 
Rafiq, S., Campodonico, C., Varese, F., 2018. The relationship between childhood adversities 
and dissociation in severe mental illness: a meta-analytic review. Acta 
Psychiatr. Scand. 138, 509–525. https://doi.org/10.1111/acps.12969. 
Read, J., Mayne, R., 2017. Understanding the long-term effects of childhood adversities: 
beyond diagnosis and abuse. J. Child Adolesc. Trauma 10, 289–297. https://doi.org/ 
10.1007/s40653-017-0137-0. 
Spitzer, R., First, M., 2005. Classification of psychiatric disorders. J. Am. Med. Assoc. 294, 
K. Allsopp, et al. Psychiatry Research 279 (2019) 15–22 
21 
1898–1899. 
Stansfeld, S., Clark, C., Bebbington, Paul, King, M., Jenkins, Rachel, Hinchliffe, S., 2016. 
Chapter 2: common mental disorders. In: McManus, S., Bebbington, P., Jenkins, R., 
Brugha, T. (Eds.), Mental Health and Wellbeing in England: Adult Psychiatric 
Morbidity Survey 2014. NHS Digital, Leeds. 
Star, S.L., Lampland, M., 2009. Reckoning with standards. In: Lampland, M., Star, S.L. 
(Eds.), Standards and Their Stories: How Quantifying, Classifying, and Formalizing 
Practices Shape Everyday Life. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, pp. 3–34. 
Suchman, L., 1987. Plans and Situated Actions. Cambridge Univ. Press, pp. 224. https:// 
doi.org/10.1002/asi.20714. 
Taylor, D., 2016. Prescribing according to diagnosis: how psychiatry is different. World 
Psychiatry 15 224–22. https://doi.org/10.1002/wps.20342. 
Varese, Filippo, Smeets, F., Drukker, M., Lieverse, R., Lataster, T., Viechtbauer, W., Read, 
J., van Os, J., Bentall, R.P., 2012. Childhood adversities increase the risk of psychosis: 
a meta-analysis of patient-control, prospective- and cross-sectional cohort studies. 
Schizophr. Bull. 38, 661–671. https://doi.org/10.1093/schbul/sbs050. 
Vonderlin, R., Kleindienst, N., Alpers, G.W., Bohus, M., Lyssenko, L., Schmahl, C., 2018. 
Dissociation in victims of childhood abuse or neglect: a meta-analytic review. 
Psychol. Med. 48, 2467–2476. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291718000740. 
Wakefield, J.C., 2013. DSM-5: an overview of changes and controversies. Clin. Soc. Work 
J. 41, 139–154. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10615-013-0445-2. 
Young, G., Lareau, C., Pierre, B., 2014. One quintillion ways to have PTSD comorbidity: 
recommendations for the disordered DSM-5. Psychol. Inj. Law 7, 61–74. 
K. Allsopp, et al. Psychiatry Research 279 (2019) 15–22 
22 
